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Abstract 
Recent trends suggest that young people in Britain are refraining from engaging in formal political 
processes. At the same time, they are increasingly expressing support for, and turning toward, a new 
and diverse range of non-institutionalised forms of political action in order to actualise their interests. 
Using Inglehart’s ideas on postmaterialism, we consider whether this apparent rejection of 
mainstream politics in favour of less conventional - and sometimes radical - forms of political action is 
changing over time in Britain, reflecting fluctuating economic conditions witnessed over the last two 
decades. We do this by comparing results from surveys of British 18 year olds conducted in 2002 
during an era of relative global prosperity, and then in 2011 at the height of the current global crisis. 
The findings suggest that British young postmaterialists are considerably more likely than materialists 
to participate in and support both institutionalised and non-institutionalised forms of political action. 
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1. Introduction 
Evidence suggests that young people in Britain are becoming progressively more disillusioned 
with the practice of democratic politics, rejecting the institutions of national government, and 
consequently leaving democracy in a state of relative crisis (Hay 2007; Whiteley 2012; Tormey 
2015). This is most visibly reflected in an emerging pattern of generational electoral inequality 
that sees young people significantly less likely to vote than their older contemporaries (Berry 
2012; Henn and Oldfield 2016). Although there is considerable debate as to the extent to 
which such developments are permanent or reversible (Flanagan et al. 2012; Phelps 2012), it 
has been argued that a particular outcome from these processes has been the relative 
marginalisation of youth by the political class. In effect, politicians have tended to champion 
the policy concerns of older and other more voting-inclined groups to the detriment of young 
people which has served to further reinforce their disconnection from formal politics (Furlong 
and Cartmel 2012; Birch, Gottfried and Lodge 2013; Sloam 2014). 
 
However, it is claimed by some that this persisting withdrawal of British youth from 
institutionalised politics has its parallel in a tendency towards support for, and participation 
in, new styles of non-institutionalised political action that better fit their individualised life-
styles and permit the actualisation of their political aspirations (Busse, Hashem-Wangler and 
Tholen 2015; Soler-i-Marti 2015). This perspective reflects the core assumptions underlying 
Ronald Inglehart’s Postmaterialist thesis (Inglehart 1971) which claim that young people are 
increasingly rejecting traditional political arrangements and organisational methods in favour 
of alternative and highly participative modes of political action. 
 
Although a small number of studies have previously considered the growth of postmaterialist 
preferences among contemporary British youth (Majima and Savage 2007; Sloam 2007; 
Theocharis 2011), there are to date no large-scale nationally representative studies in this 
particular field. In this article we address this gap in data and knowledge and test the efficacy 
of the postmaterialist thesis in terms of helping to explain young people’s political 
participation priorities. Furthermore, there is no published research that has systematically 
considered the specific impact of recent changes in material-economic context on youth 
political participation preferences in Britain.  Here we compare data from two connected 
studies to examine a key tenet of the postmaterialist thesis that young people’s patterns of 
support for different forms of political action reflect the underlying economic conditions of 
their socialisation. The first study was conducted in 2002 at a time of relative economic 
prosperity. At such a moment, Inglehart’s thesis assumes support for postmaterialist political 
participation methods would be high. The second study was completed in 2011 at the height 
of the current global economic recession, when the thesis suggests that postmaterialist 
preferences would be comparatively lower.  Finally, we assess the veracity of Inglehart’s claim 
that postmaterialism exhibits greater explanatory power than does socio-demographic 
background (including gender, ethnicity, social class and educational career) with respect to 
the structuring of young people’s political behaviour.     
 
In this article, we therefore aim to test the value of several key aspects of Inglehart’s 
postmaterialist thesis in helping to explain young Britons’ political participation preferences, 
by addressing three linked research questions: 
 To what extent are young people’s views of existing democratic arrangements and 
their support for different methods of political participation influenced by their 
materialist-postmaterialist value preferences? 
 How important are materialist-postmaterialist value priorities relative to young 
people’s personal socio-demographic backgrounds in shaping their support for 
different forms of political action? 
 Do young people’s political participation preferences reflect the underlying conditions 
of either economic prosperity or economic austerity experienced during their pre-
adult socialisation? 
 
 
 
2. Contemporary patterns of political participation  
Recent trends across Europe indicate that people of all ages seem less committed to national 
political systems and mainstream political parties, and are increasingly susceptible to radical 
parties and to their rhetoric (Della Porta 2006; Grimm and Pilkington 2015).  They also appear 
to be deeply sceptical of governments and of the political classes (Norris 2011; Holmes and 
Manning 2013; Hansard Society 2016).  The underlying causes of this political disengagement 
are much debated.  For instance, in Britain, Hay (2007) distinguishes between demand-side 
and supply-side explanations. Those who prioritise demand-side reasons focus on the 
changing attitudes of citizens who increasingly hold unrealistic expectations of politicians who 
are perceived to under-perform (Whiteley 2012).  In contrast, supply-side explanations 
emphasise the nature of contemporary formal politics itself, which is considered remote, 
inaccessible and largely unappealing to citizens (Hay 2007; Henn and Oldfield 2016). 
 
This apparent rupture between citizens and the institutions of democratic governance is 
particularly noticeable among young people who seem more disconnected from formal 
politics than do other age groups in Britain and in other countries (Norris 2011; Sloam 2014). 
As a consequence, the current youth generation is often decried as apathetic or even as anti-
political (Stoker 2006; Hay 2007).  However, young people in Britain are neither anti-
democratic nor innately anti-election (Henn and Foard 2014).  This is evidenced by the 75 per 
cent of 16 and 17 year olds who voted at the Scottish Independence Referendum in 2014 (The 
Electoral Commission 2014), while it is estimated that 64 per cent of registered voters aged 
18 to 24 cast a ballot at the 2016 UK referendum on EU membership (Helm 2016). These 
particular cases suggest that young citizens will take part in formal election-oriented 
(institutionalised) politics where such contests have critical meaning and value-potential for 
them.  Furthermore, the 2016 EU Referendum demonstrated that young people are a 
generation apart in terms of their value priorities and identity politics, with a positive vision 
of Britain’s relationship with Europe that was distinct from those of their older and more 
Eurosceptic contemporaries (Fox 2016). Such attitudes were reflected in the final vote, with 
75 per cent of 18 to 24 year olds opting to remain in the EU while the country at large voted 
to leave by a margin of 52 to 48 per cent (YouGov 2016). 
 
Despite their willingness to vote in these identity-oriented Referenda, young people’s 
participation in UK-wide general elections since the turn of the new Millennium continues to 
remain noticeably lower than it was during previous decades (Dar 2013).  It is also significantly 
less than for their older contemporaries, with for instance 76 per cent of those aged 65 and 
over voting at the 2015 contest compared to 43 per cent of 18 to 24 year olds – a generational 
electoral gap of 33 per cent (Ipsos MORI 2015).  
 
Although young people are generationally distinct in terms of their patterns of electorally-
oriented participation, it has been argued that this reflects a rejection of formal 
institutionalised politics and an inclination towards alternative forms of participation, rather 
than political disinterest per se.  For instance, Phelps (2012) has identified an ‘anti-apathy’ 
model (Bentley et al. 1999; White, Bruce and Ritchie 2000; Henn, Weinstein and Forrest 2005; 
Marsh, O’Toole and Jones 2007) that contends that young people are progressively 
gravitating towards new styles of political participation that are extra-parliamentary in 
nature, non-hierarchical and considered to be self-actualising and consequently highly 
efficacious (Beck 1992; Farthing 2010; Furlong and Cartmel 2012). The reconfiguration of 
political engagement in recent decades (Bauman 1999) reflects the demand-side explanation 
of political disengagement (see: Hay 2007). The tendency towards individualism in late 
modernity has meant that people are increasingly rejecting institutional politics in favour of 
alternative forms of participation (Giddens 1991). The increase in individualised values has a 
corresponding influence on political behaviour, as people eschew the traditional, hierarchical 
format of participation in favour of a looser politics which is created from below (Beck and 
Beck-Gernsheim 2002).    
 
This claim that alternative forms of political participation are replacing traditional modes of 
engagement has support in a number of studies (Stolle, Hooghe and Micheletti 2005; Li and 
Marsh 2008). Younger generations are far more likely to take part in non-institutionalised 
forms of political engagement such as boycotting or attending demonstrations, whereas their 
older contemporaries prefer institutionalised methods of engagement such as voting 
(Quintelier 2007; Melo and Stockemer 2014). For instance, while British youth are 
conspicuous by their declining presence at recent elections, they have been actively 
participating in extra-parliamentary actions such as the 2010 student protests (Hopkins, Todd 
and Newcastle Occupation 2011) and the youth-led occupations that took place across the 
country in 2011 and 2012 (Halvorsen 2012).  Furthermore, this apparent expansion of non-
institutionalised political action has been facilitated by developments in social media and 
online activism (Vromen, Xenos and Loader 2015); in an era of increasingly individualised 
politics, such online collaboration has facilitated seemingly disparate individuals to unite 
around personalised causes and coordinate forms of multilateral actions (Parigi and Gong 
2014). 
 
 
3. Postmaterial political participation  
In many respects, these developing patterns of contemporary political participation were 
anticipated by Ronald Inglehart’s seminal work, The Silent Revolution (1971) which formed 
the foundation for his postmaterialist thesis. Crucial to this thesis is the centrality of economic 
forces in shaping citizens’ values and behaviours.  As the post-war austerity decades came to 
a close at the end of the 1960s, Inglehart claimed that changing economic conditions were 
having a profound and transformative impact on political behavioural and value priorities 
across Europe (Inglehart 1971; Inglehart and Welzel 2005).  In particular, while older 
generations were socialised under conditions of relative economic insecurity into privileging 
materialist concerns, younger adults’ formative experiences were of relatively high and stable 
economic affluence (1971: 991).   
 
Reflecting on these emerging processes, Inglehart claimed that, ‘…as a result of long-term 
economic security, an intergenerational value change was taking place from Materialist to 
Postmaterialist priorities’ (Inglehart 1990: 7). Consequently, younger Europeans displayed a 
preference for higher-order postmaterial concerns such as environmental sustainability and 
freedom of expression.  Furthermore, freed from the urgency of material survival, 
postmaterialists were typified by a deepening awareness of, and frustration with, the limits 
of existing democratic arrangements and institutionalised forms of political participation - and 
more so than their materialist counterparts.  Instead, they were attracted to an alternative 
and transformative politics, advocating political reform while also supporting and 
participating in new forms and styles of non-institutionalised political action.  In some 
respects, Inglehart’s postmaterialist thesis anticipated the demand-side explanation of young 
citizens’ disengagement from formal politics, and the emergence of a less deferential and 
more critical electorate as characterised in the work of Hay (2007) and Norris (2011).  The 
thesis also offers a potentially valuable theoretical lens for empirically examining the 
dynamics of contemporary manifestations of youth political behaviour as outlined above.  
 
In addition to its emphasis on underlying economic context, the postmaterialist thesis also 
challenged existing political science explanations of the time that situated political 
participation in people’s socio-demographic characteristics, including their social class, 
education, gender and ethnicity (Verba and Nie, 1972).  While acknowledging that key 
variables such as age, social class and education influenced whether individuals developed 
materialist or postmaterialist value preferences, Inglehart claimed that, over-time, a 
materialist-postmaterialist cleavage would come to replace such socio-demographic variables 
as key predictors of political participation (Inglehart 2016).      
 
The postmaterialist thesis has been the subject of considerable controversy, however.  In 
particular, studies have questioned whether a postmaterialist generational shift in political 
participation preferences has actually occurred. For instance, research conducted by Flanagan 
and colleagues (2012) suggests that young people are delaying their engagement with politics 
due to changes in their life-cycle, and that they will begin to participate in formal politics in 
greater numbers when they have achieved the markers of adulthood - such as home-
ownership and secure employment - later in life. Grasso’s (2014) recent study, which analysed 
age, period and cohort effects, has cast doubts upon the postmaterialist notion that young 
people’s inclination towards alternative participation is mediated by the prosperity within 
their society. She concluded that being socialised in a politically volatile era, characterised by 
strong ideological divisions, is more influential than the affluence of that society in 
encouraging people to conduct non-institutionalised politics. Contemporary austerity, 
therefore, may inspire young people to engage with postmaterial values, rather than 
prioritising material concerns as Inglehart’s thesis would suggest.  
 
One key aspect for reflection on the value of Inglehart’s thesis is the extent to which it can 
help with understanding patterns of political participation during periods of economic 
insecurity as well as economic prosperity – particularly given the longevity of the current 
global recession.  Inglehart has previously conceded that during times of economic downturn, 
the advance of postmaterialist values and support for postmaterialist styles of non-
institutionalised political participation would somewhat reduce (Inglehart and Welzel 2005).  
Despite such cyclical patterns linked to underlying changes within the economy, there is some 
evidence to suggest that there has been an increase in the proportion of the population taking 
part in such alternative activities over the last 35 years as the transformation in political values 
begins to influence people’s political action (Inglehart and Catterberg 2003).  Furthermore, 
academic studies have identified a link between postmaterialist preferences and political 
consumerism such as boycotting and buycotting which have become an essential ingredient 
in younger people’s political behaviour (Stolle, Hooghe and Micheletti 2005). Those partaking 
in political consumerism are likely to demonstrate postmaterial preferences, valuing forms of 
direct action while being dubious of institutionalised politics to deliver results (Copeland 
2014). However, the ongoing global economic crisis has served to obfuscate patterns of 
postmaterialist preferences, and recent research suggests there has been a reduction in 
postmaterial values and political actions in many countries (Cameron 2013; Brym 2016; 
Janmaat 2016). 
 
In this article, we consider the veracity of Inglehart’s postmaterialist thesis by examining 
recent patterns of young people’s political participation in Britain.  This is assessed by a 
comparison of the results from two linked studies that focus on the political participation 
preferences of separate cohorts of 18-year-old British youth.  The first study was conducted 
in 2002 during an era of relative global prosperity, whilst the second study was completed in 
2011 at the height of the current financial crisis.  These represent two distinct economic 
periods which are important for testing Inglehart’s postmaterialist thesis.  For instance, data 
indicate that in 2002, UK GDP annual growth was 2.4% and had fallen to 1.5% by 2011 
following the onset of the global recession (ONS 2016a). For the same years, wage growth 
reduced from 2.9% to 1.6% (ONS 2016b), and the unemployment rate increased from 5.2% 
to 8.1% (ONS 2016c).  By taking two samples across these time periods, we are able to 
statistically compare whether young people’s political participation preferences are also 
shaped by the economic conditions of their pre-adult socialisation as specified in Inglehart’s 
postmaterialist thesis. 
Our hypotheses are: 
 
H1: Levels of dissatisfaction with current democratic arrangements will be higher among 
young postmaterialists than among other young people. 
 
H2: Young postmaterialists will be less likely than their contemporaries to support and take 
part in institutionalised forms of political participation in the future, and more likely to 
support and involve themselves in non-institutionalised methods of political action. 
 
H3:  The relative weight of young people’s materialist-postmaterialist values on their 
support for and participation in institutionalised and non-institutionalised forms of 
political participation will be greater where their pre-adult socialisation experiences were 
gained under conditions of relative economic security than for those socialised under 
conditions of economic austerity. 
 
H4: Materialist-postmaterialist value preferences will have a greater impact on young 
people’s future patterns of political participation than will socio-demographic variables. 
4. Research design  
To test these hypotheses, our analyses are based on the examination of two large-scale 
quantitative datasets previously completed by one of the authors that allow us to consider 
young people’s patterns of political participation over time (see xxxx, 2003; xxxx, 2012)i. 
 
Phase 1: 2002 postal survey 
A representative sample of 705 attainers living in England, Scotland and Wales was obtained 
via a postal survey conducted in the spring of 2002, one year after the General election of 
2001. We selected 18-year-old attainers at this time because that particular election contest 
was their first ever opportunity to vote.  It therefore implied that they were relatively 
inexperienced in comparison to others who had been eligible to vote at previous elections, 
and suggested that they were less likely than their contemporaries to have already formed 
deep-seated views about politics, parties and politicians.  This was important because we 
wanted to assess the views and reactions of this particular age group after they had been 
granted their ﬁrst opportunity as newly enfranchised citizens to gain experience of life under 
a new government. This study did not require participants to have actually voted in the election 
process. 
 
The electoral register formed the basis for a random sample of the eligible population to be 
accessed. Standard ACORN categories as defined by the Government Standard Region were 
used to stratify the sample. A total of 3,109 surveys were distributed to potential participants 
and 705 completed surveys were returned, representing an overall response rate of 23%.  
 
 
Phase 2 – 2011 online survey  
The second study comprised a representative sample of 1,025 young people aged 18 at the time 
of the 2010 UK General Election. The survey was distributed online using a formal polling 
organisation to embrace modern collection methods and access the largest sample possible.  
The survey data collection phase was undertaken during April and May 2011 which was one 
year after the completion of the UK General Election. This was consistent with the 2002 study 
to minimise unintended variation across the samples.  
 
We are aware that social surveys are not infallible. Polling before the 2015 general election 
and the 2016 EU referendum proved to be imprecise and did not accurately reflect people’s 
voting preferences or the eventual results. However, in our study we are not making election 
forecasts.  Instead, we are seeking to identify broad clusters of young people with similar values 
(postmaterialists, materialists and a third ‘mixed’ group).  Furthermore, the trends identified in 
the ‘Findings’ section below are consistent across the various political participation indicators 
and reinforce each other for the materialist-postmaterialist gap. 
 
Independent variables 
We use Inglehart’s four-item scale to infer respondents’ materialist-postmaterialist value 
preferences.  This scale classifies Materialists as those who prioritise ‘maintaining order in the 
nation’ and ‘fighting rising prices’ while Postmaterialists are those who selected expressive 
items, including ‘protecting freedom of speech’ and ‘giving people more say in important 
political decisions’ (1971, p.994).  A third ‘Mixed’ group comprised those who selected one 
category from each of these paired responses.  Postmaterialists comprise 17.3 per cent of the 
2002 sample, while materialists represent 13.5 per cent of the group; the remaining 55.5 per 
cent are mixed.  In the 2011 cohort, the respective figures are 11.4, 27.3 and 53.0 per cent. 
 
In examining the impact of the materialist-postmaterialist variable, we are cognisant of the 
existence of studies which recognise the value of other variables in potentially structuring 
political action preferences. For instance, evidence suggests that age completed education 
(Whiteley 2012), educational qualifications (Tenn 2007), gender (Norris and Inglehart 2009; 
Furlong and Cartmel 2012), social class (Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley 2004) and ethnicity (Heath 
et al. 2011) are all important predictors. We examine each of these socio-demographic factors 
along-side the materialist-postmaterialist variable to assess the relative explanatory weight 
of each.  Social class is measured using the established National Statistics Socio-Economic 
Classification scheme (NS-SEC).  Participants self-reported their social class position and this 
was defined by the status of the main wage earner in their household rather than their own 
specific circumstances. This was selected as a better choice as due to the sample age, their 
personal circumstances would not necessarily be an accurate representation of their true 
familial social economic circumstances. These categories were composited into whether the 
main wage earner can be categorised as being managerial/professional (middle class), or not. 
Whether the participants held educational and vocational qualifications that would be sufficient 
to provide a route through to higher education are included in the Educational Qualifications 
variable. Respondents’ ethnicity, gender and whether or not they had opted to remain in full 
time education by the age of 18 rather than leave at an earlier point were also selected as key 
independent variables. 
  
Dependent variables 
 
A range of dependent variables which utilised a variety of response formats were employed 
in the analysis. These included dichotic categorical questions using a simple yes/no format, 
individual-response multi-category formats and a range of ordinal Likert-type scaled response 
questions.  For all of the categorical analyses conducted, the ‘don’t know/no answer’ 
response options were treated as missing data and removed from the analysis. This was done 
in order to be able to analyse only the comparisons between active answers. The ‘don’t 
know/no answer’ option was also removed from the analyses using the Likert-type response 
formats. For all scaled response items this category was included as an alternative answer but 
not part of the scale itself. All analyses using scaled response data excluded this category. For 
questions using a 5-point Likert-type response format the middle value was included in the 
analyses.  
 
Several variables were used to indicate respondents’ views on existing political processes and 
arrangements, as well as their support for and intended future participation in different types 
of political action – both traditional institutionalised methods as well as alternative extra-
parliamentary non-institutionalised approaches. There is no agreement as how to define 
these institutionalised and non-institutionalised methods, and we were guided by the 
typologies of Verba and Nie (1972), Barnes and Kaase (1979), Zukin et al. (2006), Marien, 
Hooghe and Quintelier (2010), and Sloam (2014). Using principal components factor analyses 
we subsequently created two factor scales for institutionalised and non-institutionalised 
political actions. These measures were derived from the question, ‘Thinking about the next 
few years, using a scale from 1 – 5, where 1 means very unlikely and 5 means very likely. How 
likely is it that you will:’   
 
Institutionalised actions 
1. Vote in the next UK General Election?  
2. Vote in the next local council election?  
3. Vote in the next election for the European Parliament?  
4. Try to convince someone else how to vote?  
5. Give money to a political party?  
6. Work for a political party or a candidate in an election campaign?  
 
Non-institutionalised actions 
1. Be active in a voluntary organisation, like a community association, charity group, or a 
sports club?   
2. Participate in a protest, like a rally or a demonstration, to show concern about a public 
issue or problem?   
3. Work actively with a group of people to address a public issue or tackle a problem?   
4. Discuss politics with family or friends?   
5. Get involved in a youth council or forum?   
 
 
5. Findings 
The following analyses provide an overview of young people’s preferences regarding 
institutionalised and non-institutionalised forms of political participation, and the extent to 
which these are related to materialist-postmaterialist priorities.  The influence of economic 
context will also be considered - in particular, whether support for conventional 
institutionalised and alternative non-institutionalised choices vary according to whether 
these youth cohorts have been socialised under conditions of relative economic security (the 
2002 sample) or economic austerity (the 2011 sample). It will then consider the impact of 
Inglehart’s materialist-postmaterialist cleavage on political action preferences relative to key 
socio-demographic variables. 
 
Postmaterialism, democracy and extra-parliamentary political action 
The survey results are broadly consistent with expectations from Hypothesis 1, indicating that 
young people’s levels of satisfaction with current democratic arrangements vary according to 
their materialist-postmaterialist value preferences, with postmaterialists noticeably critical of 
the status quo and in favour of democratic reform.  Overall satisfaction with British 
democracy is outlined in Table I, with higher mean scores (from 1 to 4) representing higher 
levels of dissatisfaction. The one-way ANOVA analyses reveal that that young postmaterialists 
in the 2002 cohort are less satisfied with democracy than are materialists and those from the 
intermediate ‘mixed’ group - although the mean differences are not significant.  A similar 
pattern is evident within the 2011 group, although in this case the extent to which 
postmaterialists are more discontented than are materialists is statistically significant (p = 
.003).ii  
 
Table II uses Chi-square and demonstrates that there are statistically significant differences 
in views expressed about the electoral system.  Postmaterialists are considerably more likely 
than their contemporaries to reject the existing voting arrangements and emphasise instead 
a preference for changing the current first-past-the-post electoral system.  Again, the 
differences are statistically significant in both 2002 and 2011 samples, and fit with Inglehart’s 
claim that postmaterialists will be more likely than other people to embrace reforms designed 
to extend democratisation of political processes. 
 
Table I about here 
 
Table II about here 
 
While critical of existing democratic arrangements, these same young postmaterialists are 
also decidedly more likely than are their counterparts to approve of alternative non-
institutionalised and extra-parliamentary forms of political participation. Table III summarises 
the results from one-way ANOVA analyses where lower mean scores (from 1 to 5) imply 
greater support for a number of such participation methods. The data indicate that young 
postmaterialists are considerably more likely than other youth to agree that involvement with 
groups like Greenpeace represents a more effective means for influencing government than 
does activity in a political party.  The group difference is noticeable for the 2002 cohort and 
statistically significant for the 2011 sample (p = .003).  Furthermore, data from the 2011 
survey reveal that postmaterialists are also much more likely than are other groups to 
prioritise involvement with direct action groups over political parties, and this difference is 
statistically significant (p < .001).iii Finally, a similar pattern is evident on the question of 
whether or not people should be allowed to organise public meetings in protest against the 
government.  Again, the differences are statistically significant, with young postmaterialists 
much more likely to express agreement with such a notion than other young people, and this 
is the case for both 2002 and 2011 cohorts.   
 
Table III about here 
 
Taken together, the findings in Tables I, II and III align with Inglehart’s thesis and Hypotheses 
1 and 2.  Postmaterialists in Britain are particularly frustrated with existing democratic 
arrangements, and considerably more supportive of extra-parliamentary forms of political 
action than are materialists and those from the mixed group.  Interestingly, the 
distinctiveness of the postmaterialists is much more evident for the 2011 ‘austerity’ sample 
than for the 2002 ‘prosperity’ group, and this runs counter to Inglehart’s expectation in 
Hypothesis 3 that the materialist-postmaterialist divide will be more evident during periods 
of relative economic affluence than during times of comparative economic downturn. It does, 
however, evidence the enduring strength of postmaterialism as a force in shaping young 
people’s views on these matters in contemporary Britain, and this accords with Inglehart’s 
expectation that postmaterialist priorities would persist even during times of economic 
insecurity. 
 
 
 
Postmaterialism and participation in institutionalised and non-institutionalised forms of 
political action 
Not only is there variation in young people’s levels of support for democratic arrangements 
and different styles of political participation, but there are also differences in terms of the 
extent to which they express intentions to take part in political actions in the future. Figure I 
summarises mean scores (1 to 5) for the six electorally-oriented institutionalised political 
participation variables and the five alternative non-institutionalised variables. In terms of 
institutionalised methods of political participation, the data indicate high mean scores for 
future voting turnout at national, local and European contests, each of which is above the 
mid-point of 2.5 for both the 2002 and 2011 samples.  However, young people express 
relatively little intention to directly support political parties - whether in terms of trying to 
convince someone else how to vote, donating money to them, or campaigning for a party or 
an election candidate.  We would expect this, given the findings in previous research that 
while broadly supportive of democratic processes in principle, young people are dissatisfied 
with the outcomes from such processes in practice, and are particularly antipathetic of parties 
and the political class in general (Bastedo 2015).   
 
Patterns of likely future participation in non-institutionalised political activity are equally 
mixed.  Young people are considerably more likely to express future intentions to discuss 
politics with friends and family and to participate in voluntary organisations, than they are to 
take part in political actions such as protests, collective actions to address issues of public 
concern, or involvement in youth councils or forums.  This is perhaps not surprising in that 
these are relatively more demanding as they involve higher levels of intensity, commitment, 
risk and energy (Marien, Hooghe and Quintelier 2010).  
 
Figure I about here 
There are clear differences between the political activity likelihood scores of the two sample 
groups over time.  Independent t-test analyses indicate that - with the exceptions of voting in 
future national elections and activity in voluntary organisations - the 2011 youth cohort are 
statistically significantly more likely than the 2002 group to express an intention to take part 
in all of the institutionalised and non-institutionalised political actions addressed.  It may be 
that this reflects a generalised discontent with austerity policies introduced by the UK 
government following the onset of the 2008 global recession, and a desire by young people 
to consider participating in different forms of political action to challenge the social and 
economic disparities that have had a disproportionately negative impact on the youth 
population (Birch, Gottfried and Lodge 2013; Grasso 2014). 
 
Using a one-way ANOVA, the data indicate that these intentions to participate in different 
modes of political activity are affected by young people’s materialist-postmaterialist value 
preferences.  Table IV summarises the interactions between the materialist-postmaterialist 
variable and the six institutionalised and five alternative non-institutionalised political 
participation variables.  In line with Inglehart’s thesis and the expectations of Hypothesis 2, 
young postmaterialists in Britain are considerably more likely than are their counterparts to 
express an intention to participate in extra-parliamentary non-institutionalised activities at 
some point in the near future.  This is the case for all such variables for the 2002 cohort who 
were sampled during the context of relative economic prosperity.  Perhaps surprisingly, 
comparisons are also statistically significant for the 2011 sample in all bar one case; the only 
exception is the item, ‘Be active in a voluntary organisation, like a community association, 
charity group, or a sports club’ (although the p value of .082 is close to the p ≤ 0.05 statistical 
significance threshold).  This suggests that even after the shift to deep austerity conditions 
prompted by the 2008 global financial crisis, young British postmaterialists are considerably 
more receptive to extra-parliamentary non-institutionalised modes of political action than are 
materialists and the mixed groups. This runs counter to Hypothesis 3 which would expect a 
relative weakening in the impact of the materialist-postmaterialist cleavage during such a 
transition in economic conditions. 
 
Somewhat contrary to Inglehart’s thesis and to Hypothesis 2 that young postmaterialists 
would eschew traditional electoral politics in favour of extra-parliamentary actions, the data 
suggest that this group is more likely than are their contemporaries to express the ambition 
to take part in several of the institutionalised political activities. For the 2002 prosperity 
sample, these include their plans to vote in future local council and European Assembly 
elections, as well as the intention to try to convince someone else how to vote.  For the 
remaining items, postmaterialists are more likely to participate than are materialists and 
those in the mixed group, although the differences are not statistically significant.  A similar 
pattern is revealed for the 2011 sample in that postmaterialists are more inclined towards all 
such conventional forms of political action than are other young people.  The mean 
differences are statistically significant in all cases except for the two items, voting in national 
and local council elections.  
 
Table IV about here 
 
Table V allows us to directly examine the notion as set out in Hypothesis 3 that support for 
different forms of political action will reflect the material circumstances prevalent in societies 
at any one time.  Using univariate ANOVA, this compares materialists’ and postmaterialists’ 
mean scores for both institutionalised and non-institutionalised forms of political action over 
time. The data reveal that there are no significant differences between the two cohorts for 
either the institutionalised (p = .912) or the non-institutionalised (p = .511) political actions.  
This suggests that contrary to Hypothesis 3, the materialist-postmaterialist cleavage is no 
more or less evident under the 2011 austerity conditions than during the period of relative 
economic security experienced by the 2002 cohort. 
 
Table V about here 
 
 
 
Postmaterialism, socio-demographic background and political participation  
The analyses so far indicate that the materialist-postmaterialist variable strongly interacts 
with young people’s institutionalised and non-institutionalised participation inclinations.  
Table VI reports the results from analyses using hierarchical regression to address Hypothesis 
4.  It tests the power of this postmaterialist variable relative to personal socio-demographic 
factors in terms of structuring young people’s preferred methods of political action. The data 
also allow for an examination of Hypothesis 3, whether any such patterns correlate with the 
shift in economic circumstances witnessed from the 2002 context of relative affluence to the 
2011 austerity period.   
 
The results reveal that the materialist-postmaterialist variable has a strong predictive impact 
on both institutionalised and non-institutionalised methods of political participation, and this 
is evident in nearly all cases and for both time periods examined. The only exceptions for the 
2002 cohort are that the variable has no statistical bearing on either voting in UK national 
elections or working for a political party; in the 2011 sample, such relationships are present 
for all variables except for trying to convince someone else how to vote and being active in a 
voluntary organisation. 
 
The materialist-postmaterialist variable also exercises greater explanatory impact than any of 
the socio-demographic factors considered, and this is the case for both the 2002 ‘economic 
prosperity’ cohort and also for the 2011 ‘austerity’ sample. There is some limited evidence of 
a gender gap for the 2002 group, although this is not consistent; young females are more 
likely to state an interest in trying to convince someone else how to vote, while males are 
more likely to express an intention to donate money to a political party.  For the 2011 sample, 
males are more likely than females to consider working actively with others to address a 
public issue, discuss politics with others, and to get involved with a youth council or forum. 
Ethnicity displays a strong effect only for the 2011 cohort, with white youth more likely than 
those from BME backgrounds to participate in five of the eleven methods of political action.  
There is also some evidence of enduring impact exerted by social class for both samples. 
Young people from managerial/ professional households are more likely than working class 
youth to declare intentions to vote in future elections (2002 and 2011 groups) and to convince 
someone else how to vote (2002 group). However, social class is predictive only of a small 
number of the non-institutionalised political participation variables, including activity in 
voluntary organisations (2002 and 2011 samples) and discussing politics with friends and 
family (2002 cohort).   
 
Interestingly, the two education variables display different degrees of impact on intended 
political participation activity.  Holding higher educational and vocational qualifications is 
predictive only of voting in UK general elections (2002 and 2011), getting involved with a 
youth group or forum (2002) and discussing politics with others (2011).  In contrast, whether 
or not young people had opted to remain in full time education beyond the age of 18 exerts 
a considerably broader impact on future political participation plans.  This is the case with 
respect to voting (2002 and 2011 samples), but also to several of the non-institutionalised 
political action variables in 2002 (voluntary activities and also discussion with family and 
friends) and especially so in 2011 (with the exception of activity in voluntary organisations). 
However, the predictive power of this particular educational variable is considerably less than 
is the influence of the materialist-postmaterialist variable. 
 
Together, the findings reported in Table VI seem to correspond with Inglehart’s thesis that 
the materialist-postmaterialist cleavage would, in time, begin to eclipse the explanatory 
power of such socio-demographic variables as a predictor of youth political behaviour in 
contemporary Britain. None of the socio-demographic variables exert such an impact as the 
materialist-postmaterialist variable on either the institutionalised or the non-institutionalised 
methods of political participation. This is particularly the case for the 2002 sample, and this 
fits the thesis that postmaterialism will be particularly evident during periods of relative 
economic prosperity.  However, that the materialist-postmaterialist variable continues to 
exert at least as much power as any of the socio-demographic variables for the 2011 sample 
(when respondents were socialised during a period of relative economic austerity), 
contradicts Hypothesis 3.  Nonetheless, it is also indicative of the enduring nature of 
postmaterialism, and therefore coincides with Inglehart’s claim (2016) that postmaterialist 
values would continue to shape political behaviour even during periods of economic 
insecurity.  
 
Table VI about here 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
The evidence presented in much political sociology points to a youth generation in 
contemporary Britain that is progressively withdrawing from formal democratic politics 
(Sloam 2014; Birch, Gottfried and Lodge 2013). This is particularly noticeable in terms of their 
lack of participation in institutionalised politics, and especially their absence from voting at 
elections since 2001. However, whether this pattern of electoral non-participation is 
indicative of a generalised political apathy amongst young people is open to debate.  In 
particular, there is a considerable body of research suggesting that young people are 
positively rejecting formal electorally-oriented politics because they feel marginalised by the 
political class, and alienated from democratic institutions (Berry 2012; Henn and Oldfield 
2016).  Instead, British youth appear to be increasingly attracted to alternative modes of non-
institutionalised political action such as political consumerism, protests and direct action 
(Stolle, Hooghe and Micheletti 2005; Melo and Stockemer 2014).  Such political actions are 
considered to be particularly efficacious and appealing to young people as they provide a style 
of politics that is accessible, flexible and participative (Furlong and Cartmel 2012); they also 
allow avoidance of the hierarchical approaches endemic in existing electoral politics and 
reflected in the practices of many mainstream political parties.  Consequently, it is argued by 
some that such repertoires of political action seem to better fit the individualised life-styles 
of the contemporary youth generation and present greater transformative prospects for self-
actualisation (Soler-i-Marti 2015). 
 
The findings from this study reveal that today’s youth generation in Britain is attracted to such 
non-institutionalised methods of political action.  However, the pattern is not uniform.  In line 
with Inglehart’s thesis and with Hypothesis 1, young postmaterialists appear to be particularly 
critical of the way that democracy operates in this country, and are especially supportive of 
plans to reform the electoral system that are intended to reduce the hegemony of the 
traditional political parties and enhance the prospects of smaller competitor parties.  They 
are also considerably more tolerant of extra-parliamentary protest actions and are more open 
to the value of pressure group activity and direct action than are their contemporaries.  
 
The data also lend partial support to Hypothesis 2.  Young people’s support for, and intended 
future participation in, institutionalised and non-institutionalised forms of political 
participation reflects their materialist-postmaterialist value preferences.  Young 
postmaterialists are certainly more inclined towards extra-parliamentary and non-
institutionalised political repertoires than are other young people, and the differences 
between these groups are statistically significant.   However, somewhat contrary to 
Inglehart’s thesis, this same group of young postmaterialists are also noticeably more 
predisposed than their contemporaries to institutionalised political participation methods.  
The expectation from Hypothesis 2 is that this group of young citizens would reject such 
electorally-oriented methods as having little efficacy and self-actualisation potential; 
however, contrary to this notion, the evidence from this study indicates that young 
postmaterialists value such methods considerably more than do other young people.  This is 
particularly interesting for the 2011 sample, especially so given that the programmes on offer 
from the main political parties represented broadly similar variants of austerity.  However, 
this may reflect a particularly critical response from these young postmaterialists who are 
prepared in the future to partake in any form of political action – whether institutionalised or 
non-institutionalised – if such methods offer a means to challenge recent government 
austerity policies which have had a disproportionately negative impact on the British youth 
generation. 
 
Interestingly, there is little evidence to support Hypothesis 3 that the relationship between 
materialist-postmaterialist value preferences and political participation orientations is 
contingent upon the prevailing economic conditions during pre-adult socialisation.  The data 
indicate that postmaterialist values continue to endure as the economy transitions from a 
context of relative security to one of austerity following the onset of the current global 
recession.  Although Hypothesis 3 is therefore not confirmed, these findings do suggest by 
implication that Inglehart’s postmaterialist thesis has ongoing theoretical and explanatory 
value with respect to British youth in contemporary context, even under conditions of 
economic austerity.  Moreover, the materialist-postmaterialist variable exerts considerably 
greater predictive power in structuring young people’s patterns of political participation than 
do the socio-demographic variables considered as part of this study.  Gender, ethnicity, social 
class, qualifications and educational trajectory each display an important bearing on political 
participation orientation, but the evidence presented reveals that in line with Hypothesis 4, 
materialist-postmaterialist value preferences exert significantly greater comparative impact 
on young people’s political participation inclinations. 
 
In conclusion, it would seem that alongside their deepening disconnection from mainstream 
democratic politics, young Britons are also becoming increasingly open to postmaterialist 
ideas and attracted to different forms of political action that allow them to pursue their 
aspirations for meaningful political change. This reflects the demand-side explanation for 
levels and patterns of political participation which is rooted in changing values and the 
emergence of a critical youth citizenry.  Taken together, our findings suggest that Inglehart’s 
postmaterialist thesis maintains importance and relevance in helping us to understand the 
dynamics of young people’s political engagement and participation in contemporary Britain.  
This is the case even under existing economic austerity conditions which are usually theorised 
as less conducive for the transmission of postmaterialist values and political participation 
preferences. 
  
Figure I: Mean likelihood of taking part in political action in the next few years (1 – 5 scale, where 1 means very unlikely and 5 means very 
likely) 
 
 
* Election-oriented institutionalised political participation variables 
** Alternative non-institutionalised political participation variables 
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Table I: On the whole, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way that democracy works 
in this country? 
 
Satisfaction with democracy in this country Mean SD 
2002 
Materialist 2.52 .752 
Mixed 2.50 .653 
Postmaterialist 2.63 .758 
F (2,327) = .975, p = .378 
2011 
Materialist 2.29 .639 
Mixed 2.42 .723 
Postmaterialist 2.56 .740 
F (2,835) = 5.927, p = .003 
 
 
 
 
 
Table II: Some people say that we should change the voting system to allow smaller political 
parties to get a fairer share of MP’s. Others say that we should keep the voting system as it 
is to produce effective government. Which view comes closer to your own? 
 
Perceptions of the voting system Materialist Mixed 
Post 
materialist 
2002 
We should change the voting 
system 
Per cent 
Standardised Residual 
22.9 
-1.6 
33.6 
-.2 
44.6 
1.8 
We should keep the voting 
system as it is 
Per cent 
Standardised Residual 
45.7 
1.3 
37.1 
.2 
28.7 
-1.3 
It would make no difference Per cent 
Standardised Residual 
31.4 
.4 
29.3 
.1 
26.7 
-.4 
  N = 478,          χ2 = 9.476,           p = .050 
2011 
We should change the voting 
system 
Per cent 
Standardised Residual 
23.8 
-2.8 
36.7 
.2 
59.1 
3.6 
We should keep the voting 
system as it is 
Per cent 
Standardised Residual 
46.1 
1.3 
39.9 
-.1 
29.5 
-1.6 
It would make no difference Per cent 
Standardised Residual 
30.1 
1.8 
23.4 
-.1 
11.4 
-2.4 
  N = 725,          χ2 = 34.140,           p = .001 
 
  
Table III: Views on non-institutionalised and extra-parliamentary forms of political action* 
 
Being involved with groups like Greenpeace is a better way to influence 
government than being active in a party 
Mean SD 
2002 
Materialist 2.59 .948 
Mixed 2.37 .784 
Postmaterialist 2.27 .790 
F (2,327) = 1.970, p = .141 
2011 
Materialist 2.71 .770 
Mixed 2.70 .922 
Postmaterialist 2.40 .980 
F (2,904) = 5.974, p = .003 
Being involved with direct action groups is a better way to influence 
government than being active in a party ** 
Mean SD 
2011 
Materialist 2.67 .712 
Mixed 2.59 .776 
Postmaterialist 2.32 .879 
F (2,896) = 8.537, p < .001 
People should be allowed to organise public meetings in protest against the 
government 
Mean SD 
2002 
Materialist 1.95 .649 
Mixed 1.85 .618 
Postmaterialist 1.62 .589 
F (2,468) = 7.387, p = .001 
2011 
Materialist 1.94 .636 
Mixed 1.76 .620 
Postmaterialist 1.48 .552 
F (2,750) = 20.087, p < .001 
* Low mean scores indicate high support 
** Question not asked in the 2002 study 
 
  
Table IV: Mean likelihood of taking part in political actions in the next few years for postmaterialists, materialists and mixed groups (1 – 5 
scale, where 1 means very unlikely and 5 means very likely) 
How likely is it that you will… 
 
2002  
Mean 
2002  
SD 
2011  
Mean 
2011  
SD 
Vote in the next UK General Election?* 
Materialist 3.91 1.33 3.92 1.35 
Mixed 3.98 1.27 4.10 1.23 
Postmaterialist 4.18 1.24 4.24 1.22 
F (2,599) = 1.495, p = .225 F (2,858) = 2.858, p = .058 
Vote in the next local council election?* 
Materialist 3.03 1.43 3.66 1.43 
Mixed 3.23 1.41 3.74 1.35 
Postmaterialist 3.62 1.30 3.94 1.35 
F (2,594) = 5.351, p = .005 F (2,845) = 1.490, p = .226 
Vote in the next election for the European 
Parliament?* 
Materialist 2.72 1.37 3.26 1.44 
Mixed 2.91 1.37 3.32 1.42 
Postmaterialist 3.33 1.41 3.69 1.41 
F (2,581) = 6.054, p = .002 F (2,830) = 3.276, p = .038 
Try to convince someone else how to vote?* 
Materialist 1.97 1.22 2.41 1.29 
Mixed 2.09 1.31 2.44 1.38 
Postmaterialist 2.38 1.47 2.81 1.30 
F (2,597) = 3.139, p = .044 F (2,858) = 3.734, p = .024 
Give money to a political party?* 
Materialist 1.30 .78 1.55 .94 
Mixed 1.46 .91 1.56 .98 
Postmaterialist 1.57 1.00 1.90 1.21 
F (2,599) = 2.443, p = .088 F (2,864) = 5.447, p = .004 
Work for a political party or a candidate in an 
election campaign?* 
Materialist 1.41 .78 1.75 1.04 
Mixed 1.53 1.03 1.78 1.08 
Postmaterialist 1.64 1.08 2.19 1.25 
F (2,591) = 1.510, p = .222 F (2,856) = 6.633, p = .001 
   
Be active in a voluntary organisation, like a 
community association, charity group, or a 
sports club?** 
Materialist 2.51 1.41 2.94 1.31 
Mixed 2.96 1.37 2.99 1.39 
Postmaterialist 3.28 1.31 3.29 1.23 
F (2,597) = 8.060, p < .001 F (2,851) = 2.504, p = .082 
Materialist 1.72 1.02 2.17 1.12 
Mixed 2.19 1.18 2.37 1.26 
Participate in a protest, like a rally or a 
demonstration, to show your concern about a 
public issue or problem?** 
Postmaterialist 2.64 1.31 3.00 1.28 
F (2,596) = 15.658, p < .001 F (2,850) = 16.746, p < .001 
Work actively with a group of people to address 
a public issue or tackle a problem?** 
Materialist 1.84 1.00 2.19 1.08 
Mixed 2.22 1.14 2.36 1.12 
Postmaterialist 2.60 1.13 2.78 1.16 
F (2,598) = 12.215, p < .001 F (2,835) = 9.819, p < .001 
Discuss politics with family or friends?** 
Materialist 3.03 1.36 3.60 1.23 
Mixed 3.37 1.45 3.70 1.27 
Postmaterialist 3.78 1.28 4.10 1.17 
F (2,594) = 7.669, p = .001 F (2,870) = 6.252, p = .002 
Get involved in a youth council or forum?** 
Materialist 1.78 1.03 2.35 1.14 
Mixed 1.96 1.13 2.47 1.25 
Postmaterialist 2.31 1.21 3.03 1.24 
F (2,598) = 6.635, p = .001 F (2,855) = 11.680, p < .001 
 
* Election-oriented institutionalised political participation variables 
** Alternative non-institutionalised political participation variables 
  
Table V: Impact of economic conditions on the mean likelihood of taking part in political 
actions in the next few years for postmaterialists and materialists (1 – 5 scale, where 1 
means very unlikely and 5 means very likely) 
 
 2002 
 
2011 
 
 
Mean 
materialist-
postmaterialist 
difference 
Standard 
Error 
Mean 
materialist-
postmaterialist 
difference 
Standard 
Error 
F P 
Institutionalised forms of 
political participation 
 
-.412 .117 -.429 .102 .012 .912 
Non-institutionalised forms of 
political participation -.740 .120 -.637 .098 .433 .511 
 
 
 
  
Table VI: Postmaterialism, socio-demographic background and political participation under 
economic prosperity (2002) and austerity (2011) conditions 
 
 2002 2011 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent variables B Beta P B Beta P 
Vote in the UK 
General 
Election 
Materialism/Postmaterialism .113 .053 .238 .176 .084 .011 
Gender -121 -.047 .290 .032 .012 .709 
Ethnicity .083 .012 .786 -.056 -.014 .663 
Qualifications -.533 -.093 .039 -.190 -.071  .033 
Time spent in full-time education .258 .099 .032 .543 .194 .000 
Social class .238 .095 .037 .221 .086 .010 
Vote in next 
local council 
election 
Materialism/Postmaterialism .265 .113 .014 .159 .069 .041 
Gender .079 .028 .533 -.035 -.012 .711 
Ethnicity .278 .037 .415 .194 .045 .178 
Qualifications -.353 -.056 .218 -.142 -.048 .156 
Time spent in full-time education .200 .069 .135 .421 .136 .000 
Social class .005 .002 .969 .188 .066 .050 
Vote in 
European 
Parliament 
election 
Materialism/Postmaterialism .325 .138 .002 .176 .071 .036 
Gender .061 .022 .626 -.109 -.036 .290 
Ethnicity .366 .048 .274 .009 .002 .954 
Qualifications -.431 -.067 .134 -.107 -.034 .321 
Time spent in full-time education .340 .117 .011 .502 .150 .000 
Social class .329 .118 .009 .032 .010 .762 
Convince 
someone how 
to vote 
Materialism/Postmaterialism .255 .112 .013 .138 .057 .094 
Gender -.254 -.093 .037 .023 .008 .820 
Ethnicity .204 .028 .531 .282 .063 .065 
Qualifications -.494 -.081 .071 .084 .027 .426 
Time spent in full-time education .085 .031 .505 .216 .066 .055 
Social class .281 .105 .021 .085 .029 .403 
Give money to 
a political party 
Materialism/Postmaterialism .153 .101 .026 .178 .086 .011 
Gender .168 .092 .041 .064 .025 .460 
Ethnicity -.090 -.018 .681 .296 .078 .022 
Qualifications -.108 -.027 .558 .010 .004 .912 
Time spent in full-time education .098 .053 .254 .021 .008 .823 
Social class -.054 -.030 .514 -.120 -.047 .165 
Work for a 
political party 
Materialism/Postmaterialism .106 .063 .173 .245 .110 .001 
Gender .011 .005 .905 -.061 -.023 .507 
Ethnicity -.195 -.036 .431 .308 .075 .027 
Qualifications -.194 -.043 .351 -.113 -.040 .241 
Time spent in full-time education .042 .020 .670 -.089 -.030 .388 
Social class .057 .028 .541 -.163 -.060 .080 
Be active in a 
voluntary 
organisation  
Materialism/Postmaterialism .401 .171 .000 .117 .049 .151 
Gender .018 .007 .880 .152 .052 .128 
Ethnicity .322 .043 .327 .067 .015 .656 
Qualifications -.176 -.028 .523 .048 .016 .644 
Time spent in full-time education .378 .132 .003 .124 .039 .263 
Social class .360 .131 .003 .221 .075 .028 
Participate in a 
protest 
Materialism/Postmaterialism .465 .226 .000 .437 .185 .000 
Gender .076 .031 .484 .072 .025 .453 
Ethnicity .421 .064 .147 .383 .088 .009 
Qualifications .126 .023 .604 .002 .001 .986 
Time spent in full-time education .173 .069  .128 .316 .100 .003 
Social class .209 .086 .054 -.069 -.024 .480 
Materialism/Postmaterialism .424 .226 .000 .244 .106 .002 
Gender .152 .068 .126 .228 .081 .016 
23 
Work actively 
to address a 
public issue 
Ethnicity -.147 -.024 .591 .508 .119 .000 
Qualifications .022 .004 .921 -.038 -.013 .703 
Time spent in full-time education .127 .055 .225 .255 .082 .016 
Social class .077 .035 .438 .033 .012 .728 
Discuss politics 
with family or 
friends 
Materialism/Postmaterialism .359 .150 .001 .213 .101 .003 
Gender -.092 -.032 .464 .220 .086 .011 
Ethnicity .567 .074 .092 -.192 -.050 .140 
Qualifications .287 .045 .309 -.229 -.085 .011 
Time spent in full-time education .339 .116 .010 .227 .081 .018 
Social class .494 .175 .000 .104 .040 .232 
Get involved 
with a youth 
council or 
forum 
Materialism/Postmaterialism .295 .155 .001 .296 .129 .000 
Gender .063 .028 .535 .262 .093 .005 
Ethnicity .395 .062 .159 .599 .141 .000 
Qualifications -.465 -.091 .043 -.108 -.037 .270 
Time spent in full-time education .133 .057 .213 .241 .078 .021 
Social class .118 .053 .244 -.095 -.033 .317 
Note: Highlighted figures are statistically significant (p < 0.05) 
 
 
Notes 
i Details withheld to maintain the anonymity of the author during the peer review process. 
ii It should be noted that following Inglehart’s expectations, we would expect the political 
participation preferences of the ‘mixed’ group to sit between the ‘materialist’ and the 
‘postmaterialist’ groups.  This is so in all cases except for Table I year 2002, where the order is mixed, 
materialist and then postmaterialist. 
iii This question was not asked in the 2002 study. 
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